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Abstract 
As the clock is ticking for a positive outcome at the Ninth WTO Ministerial Conference to be held in 
Bali in December 2013, agricultural negotiators are scrambling to find solutions to issues such as 
tariff-rate quota (TRQ) administration and export competition in order to improve trade flows. The 
main issue seems to be whether WTO rules applying to public stockpiles in developing countries 
need to be changed or temporarily suspended as a means to enhance national food security. 
This paper is based on a note submitted to the ICTSD-IPC Expert Group “Meeting on Agriculture 
and Food Security – Policy Options for MC9 and beyond” (Geneva, June 2013). It lists the policy 
instruments impacting on global, national and (urban and rural) household food security – “The 
Food Security Tool Box” – and asks which immediate decisions the WTO Ministers might take in 
this field despite the political difficulties such as continued agro-dumping practices or the “land 
grab” issue. Three such “deliverables” are outlined: (i) regional and “virtual” food security schemes 
could be allowed to provide reserves to other countries without violating the obligation to “form an 
integral part of a food security programme identified in national legislation” (Agreement on 
Agriculture, Annex II, para 3); (ii) TRQ under-fills could be improved by mandatory enquiries into low 
fill rate situations; and (iii) World Food Program (WFP) and other non-commercial food purchases 
could be exempted from export restrictions and prohibitions. 
High ambitions for Bali seem to be misplaced. A more realistic yet real progress could restore the 
dwindling credibility of the WTO as a forum for trade negotiations. 
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Three “Bali Deliverables” for more Food Security1 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Introduction 
1. Many people know and use the agreed definition of food security (“when all people, at all 
times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food” 
etc). In my view such political statements lack any normative value when it comes to the 
more important question of how to reach this goal, and what role to assign to trade and 
foreign direct investment (FDI). Food security itself, and its link with agriculture, is 
viewed differently by different experts. More importantly though, it has different connota-
tions at the global level, in each country and in each household: food-insecure families 
adopt different strategies according to whether they produce surplus food, insufficient 
food, or no food at all. 
2. As I see it, the multilateral regulatory framework has little use for general objectives. Yet 
much of the WTO discourse just repeats well-known theories (“free trade is good for 
you”), yet its membership claims policy space under such mantras as “non-trade con-
cerns” or “food security, livelihood security and rural development”. While these are all 
legitimate objectives and as such recorded in various WTO legal texts, I submit that food 
security will not automatically improve by following unidirectional tariff and subsidy re-
duction formulae. Finding a credible way forward presupposes an analysis of the present 
rules and of their deficiencies in respect of food security. What matters in the light of 
WTO rules and negotiations is not what kind of food security a country may want, but by 
what means it is to be obtained. This being the World Trade Organization, the crude ques-
1 Based on a note submitted to the ICTSD-IPC Expert Group Meeting on “Agriculture and Food Security – Poli-
cy Options for MC9 and beyond.” (Geneva, 10–12 June 2013). 
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tion is how much of their policy space its Members are prepared to trade in return for 
more market access and in order to increase their national food security through better 
trade and investment. Consequently, we must look at the tools by which food security 
might be improved at the national level. While the focus here is on trade instruments, the 
international investment dimension has grown in importance in recent years. 
3. The Food Security Tool Box outlined in Annex I is vast. Virtually all trade and investment 
policy instruments have an impact on food security. These tools may or may not be com-
patible with the present multilateral trade rules and with a country’s WTO commitments. 
For instance, domestic support programmes may be classified as “green” or “amber”, re-
gardless of whether their food security impact is direct or incidental. This impact can be 
positive or negative – or both: tariffs, safeguards and trade remedies, for example, can 
shield producers from dumped imports, but they increase consumer prices and may pre-
vent competition and productivity increases. Finally, looking at these tools only from a 
WTO perspective fails to address the food security conundrum in a holistic sense, not to 
mention climate change, which most of the time is neglected as a criterion to assess, say, 
different production incentives (Blandford 2013). Given that the biggest enemy of food 
security is poverty, policy analysts must also keep in mind the global dimension of food 
security (“how to feed 9 billion people in 2050”) as well as the development perspective 
(Galtier 2013). 
4. This note starts with my own food security assumptions. It then discusses some tools to 
which WTO rules and disciplines apply, and assesses the work presently being undertaken 
in the run-up to Bali. It concludes with three “Bali Deliverables” which, although far from 
being sufficient, look to me as being in that extremely small comfort zone and thus poten-
tially acceptable to the WTO Membership as a whole and at this point in time. 
Food Security Premises 
5. While the focus here is on multilateral trade rules for national food security, we first need 
to consider its implications at the local level. I submit here that poor households are 
“pragmatic by default”: 
a. My first assumption is that the urban poor in every country – and even a subsist-
ence farmer, for the food which he or she must buy – cannot afford to be interested 
in the origin or even the quality of the food. The cheaper the better, and the better 
also the possibilities to finance the other essential needs of humankind (health, 
clothing, housing, and education). 
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b. My second assumption is that a poor farmer has very limited options and is there-
fore first and foremost interested in livelihood and survival, regardless of whether 
and how he or she produces sustainably, whether it is food crops or cash crops, 
feed, fuel or fibres (the “4 F”), and whether this happens on his or her own land, in 
a co-operative, or as an employee on a large farm owned (rightly or wrongly) by a 
foreign or a national capitalist. 
6. Moving to national food security, I submit that different countries pursue different strate-
gies basically according to whether they are (i) richer or (ii) poorer, (iii) net food import-
ers or (iv) net exporters. In a consensus-based organisation like the WTO, all rule modifi-
cations have to fit within this “food security quadrangle”. Wishful thinking by lobbyists or 
academically perfect designs of a post-Doha level playing field will fail. 
7. Most economists agree today that the single main reason for structural food insecurity 
since the 1990s is underinvestment. Even the World Bank acknowledged in 2007 its own 
failure in this respect, despite the fact that many scholars and the World Bank’s own re-
search arm had for decades warned of the consequences of insufficient domestic and for-
eign investment in agriculture (Binswanger, Deininger, Anderson). In reality, under the 
prevailing national conditions and in the absence of a multilateral investment framework, 
few projects were profitable without subsidies and/or ODA, especially in poor countries. 
At the same time, agricultural trade distortions and market segmentation still do impact 
negatively on investment, and they hamper otherwise competitive producers elsewhere. 
Worse, the recent phenomenon of “land grabbing” can be partly attributed to a weak regu-
latory framework which I have called “FDI over-protection and under-regulation” (Annex 
2). 
8. Non-agricultural growth increased solvable demand for more and better food in many 
emerging economies. Efficient farmers in Argentina, Australia and Thailand quickly bene-
fitted from the resulting price hikes. However, the supply response capacity of poor farm-
ers continues to be stifled for various reasons, including agro-dumping. Annex 3 describes 
what I see as present-day agro-dumping. A variety of programmes with trade-distorting 
effects are still legal. Many are actually on the increase again, sometimes under the guise 
of tackling food sovereignty or climate change, especially since the collapse of the Doha 
Round. Moreover, governments and, even more, legislators in many countries and in the 
EU are again increasing farm protection and trade-distorting support, and thereby further 
weaken the resilience of small farmers in poor developing countries. Perhaps tellingly, 
this happens despite the Right to Food commitments of all countries under the UN Con-
vention on International Cultural, Economic and Social Rights (Häberli 2013). 
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Tools Analysis 
9. The biggest food security problem I see in the present WTO rules is the lack of export 
competition disciplines. While export subsidies have been reduced, all the other forms 
remain basically unrestricted. Food aid abuse, for example, is likely to be even easier after 
Doha because of the so-called “safe box” provision agreed at the WTO Ministerial in 
Hong Kong (Heri and Häberli 2011). The 2008 “modalities” propose similarly slight im-
provements for the other two forms of export promotion by unfair means, i.e. the use of 
export credits and export state trading. And no serious improvements in trade disciplines 
have been proposed for export prohibitions and restrictions (Häberli 2012). 
10. Other trade rules – or the lack thereof – may conflict with food security. I see a “double 
anti-small farmer bias” where rules either ignore the special situation of small farmers in 
developing countries, or where policies over-protect small food producers in the name of 
food security. Instead, I posit that a removal of such biases would go a long way towards 
making them competitive, at home and abroad: 
a. Some of the “old” biases were identified a long time ago, but they are still being 
felt today: post-independence industrialisation programmes through taxing farm 
exports (from Tanzania to Argentina), agricultural FDI tax exemptions (from 
Cambodia to Cameroon), absentee land sale prohibitions (Sierra Leone), or enter-
prise-stifling constraints of cooperatives legislation (Mexico).  
b. Another disincentive, especially for the poor, is that agricultural inputs cost twice 
as much for most African farmers (incidentally also for Swiss farmers) as they do 
in Latin America and East Asia – and part of the explanation of why rice yields in 
Vietnam are three times those in Malawi, despite fertiliser subsidy programmes. 
The underlying problems also prevent women farmers especially, and organic pro-
ducers, from earning better revenues on their markets.2 
c. We often hear that “green” farming is economically superior to non-sustainable 
forms of agriculture. If that is so, I wonder why poor farmers, given a choice, do 
not automatically prefer higher earnings for the same amount of work. Women 
farmers and organic producers will need more than support from NGOs if they are 
to succeed; they can only do so if and when we remove the systematic biases 
against them. Clearly, for more food security we need research and action, without 
ideological premises. 
d. Similarly, small farmers are perhaps the main victim of Right to Food violations 
by way of agro-dumping. One as yet untested avenue is litigation. For example, 
negatively affected producers, consumers, and their governments could attack bio-
2 Kerstin Mechlem, for instance, sees GMO crops as pro-poor opportunities: in Agricultural Biotechnologies, 
Transgenic Crops and the Poor: Opportunities and Challenges (28 March 2013). Human Rights Law Review 10, 
pp. 749–764 (2010); Transitional Justice Institute Research Paper No. 13-02. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2240891 
 4 
                                                 
fuel and other market-distorting subsidies, and various market access and other 
non-trade barriers erected by their competitors in potential export markets.3 
11. Therefore, while resolutely in favour of removing anti-small farmer biases, my bottom 
line on trade rules favouring small farmers is this: protection must not be unlimited in ex-
tent and time, lest small farmers become part of the problem for global and national food 
security. In a better regulatory framework and with better trade and investment rules, mil-
lions of small farmers can do much better than today, and I would argue the same for no-
mads and for the artisanal fish industry. But they cannot feed the world. 
Investment 
12. Much has been written about the commercial pressure on land which mainly came about 
after the last food crisis (2008–09). “Land grabbing” has been more decried than scientifi-
cally analysed. Once again legal scholars and regulators lag behind economists, agrono-
mists and geographers (Annex 2). 
13. For me, the often dismally low productivity of small farmers, and of under-utilised land, 
are the main reasons for the still increasing acquisition of land by foreign and big national 
investors. Also, national (and global) food security does not exclusively depend on owner-
ship. This then is a race against the clock, and the small farmers will lose it unless rapid 
action is taken both at the national and the international level. This however is not a WTO 
topic, simply because it still lacks serious rules on competition and investment. Here I can 
thus only refer to recent writings on the subject. Nonetheless, if more food security is the 
goal, we must also keep in mind the nexus between trade and agricultural FDI in our re-
flections on trade reforms – and not least that this is also a matter of international human 
rights! 
Three “Bali Deliverables” 
14. A desperate search for Ministerial decisions in Bali is going on in Geneva, without much 
in the way of results at the time of writing this note, other than ever more facets of the old 
blame and shame game, and a general lowering of ambitions and expectations. Moreover, 
the declarations of the usual suspects coming to the surface look depressingly similar to 
the impasse that ended the DDA negotiations on agriculture in 2008 – despite the same 
3 This, incidentally, might bring back to the negotiating table those countries which support their farmers forever 
and by almost any means. 
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parties hiding their same old bottom lines behind their declarations of flexibilities and ur-
gency.4 
15. One little noted operational development is the work in the Committee on Agriculture 
which in very recent years has considerably increased transparency, notifications content, 
and public information by way of press releases and new databanks. The same goes for 
the SPS and TBT Committees, but apparently less so for the Committee on Import Licens-
ing. The proposals by Tim Josling at this workshop have thus a very good chance of being 
heard: export restrictions, biofuels and “box painting” are some of the newly dealt with is-
sues he addresses and which could be even better monitored. Such improvements are 
available without implementing the overly bureaucratic Annex M of the 2008 DDA Mo-
dalities, let alone changing the substantive rules applying to such issues. Professor Josling 
is of course also perfectly right when he calls for a common assessment of agricultural 
policies under the AoA and the SCM Agreements (and in the TPRB). 
16. This note ends with a short discussion of three hotly disputed proposals in respect of food 
security, dealing with stockpiles, TRQ fills, and export restrictions on humanitarian food 
aid. All have been declared dead already. I submit they can yet be carried forward to and 
in Bali, with a few modifications. 
1. The G-33 proposal on food security deals with stockpile food purchases from poor farm-
ers, including at above-market prices. This is a classical food security topic which is still 
dividing the WTO Membership.5 The main driver here is India which incidentally over-
took Vietnam and Thailand last year to become the world’s top rice exporter. As it has of-
ten done in electoral periods, India had raised the minimum purchase prices for farmers6 
and now finds itself at the limit of its Amber Box entitlements, or beyond. To classify the-
se costly purchases, as proposed by the G33, in an enlarged Green Box, is perhaps politi-
cally arguable when one includes the social dimension of food policies for poor consum-
ers. Nonetheless, it lacks the rigour e.g. of the OECD preparatory process in support of the 
4 Bridges 07/05/13, WTO Online 30/04/13. 
5 Olivier de Schutter proposes to exempt from any WTO limitations financial support to all ‘pro food-security’ 
programmes in developing countries’: “[w]hether new policies distort markets should be a secondary considera-
tion and accorded much less weight in political decision-making“ (de Schutter 2011). Stefan Tangermann’s blunt 
answer to that argument: “[T]ariffs on food imports do not improve, they actually undermine access to food” 
6 “Finance Minister P Chidambaram has allocated an additional `10,000 crore for the “game changer” Food Se-
curity Bill pushed by UPA chairperson Sonia Gandhi.” Express News Service Article ‘Sonja-pushed food bill 
gets additional 10,000 crores’ in The New Indian Express, 1 March 2013 
(http://newindianexpress.com/nation/article1483240.ece?service=print accessed 1 May 2013). 
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Uruguay Round which led to such schemes being squarely placed in the Amber Box.7 Un-
surprisingly, the US adamantly opposes such a “reverse” reform, and is apparently sup-
ported by the EU (without acknowledging the slippages in their own domestic policy re-
forms, see Annex 3). It was Thailand’s opposition to the G33 proposal which came as a 
surprise to some observers (Chatterjee and Murphy), because it is sitting on a record 
stockpile with close to 20 metric tons of rice after having done exactly the same as India. 
This 2-year-old rice valued at US $6 billion may have to be sold as chickenfeed now that 
the new harvest hits an already depressed market.8 Thailand’s own rice support scheme 
(“paddy pledging”) has already been criticised in the Committee on Agriculture.9 Such 
anecdotal evidence aside, it is clear to me that stockpile proposals must be based on au-
thentic food security concerns, lest they face the same fate as did the SSM proposal in 
2008 on the question whether Doha safeguards should be allowed to cross Uruguay Round 
binding levels. Proponents have yet to submit evidence on how the present provision al-
lows food reserve schemes to operate, not (only) as a price support scheme but also as a 
stopgap measure in times of supply disruptions. Moreover, on the basis of experiences to 
date and the inevitably high costs and frequent losses of food reserves, it is far from clear 
why stockholding and other schemes for national food security need to be government-
operated. In the run-up to Bali and despite vehement opposition from the US Farm 
Groups, the WTO membership may yet opt for a “Peace Clause” on the crucial question 
of a purchase price above market rates (with a similar but not yet discussed issue for re-
serves released below market prices).10 In my view, only NFIDCs with few if any exports 
can hope ever to obtain WTO acceptance on a “greening” of such measures.11 Nonethe-
less, one “Bali Deliverable” I see here is for regional and “virtual” schemes to be allowed 
to provide reserves to other countries without violating the obligation to “form an integral 
part of a food security programme identified in national legislation.”12 Besides the WFP 
regional stockpiles, the only such scheme for the time being is the ASEAN Plus Three 
Emergency Rice Reserve (APTERR) signed in July 2012 but which has very limited oper-
7 “Food purchases by the government shall be made at current market prices and sales from food security stocks 
shall be made at no less than the current domestic market price for the product and quality in question.” (AoA 
Annex II para 3). 
8 Information gleaned from the Jakarta Globe, 1 May 2013 p.10. 
9 According to the WTO News on the meeting of the Committee on Agriculture held on 26 March 2013, this 
programme involves loans, with paddy (unmilled rice) as collateral valued according to government-set prices. 
10 World Trade Online, 18 September 2013. Also see the letter written by 27 US-based farm groups to the US 
Government dated October 24, 2013, referred to in World Trade Online with the same date. 
11 Somewhat surprisingly, nobody seemed to realise that even an addition to Annex II para 3 would not let 
schemes like India’s also pass the chapeau test of “not more than minimally distorting” measures. 
12 AoA Annex II para 3. 
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ations.13 ECOWAS had discussed similar plans for West Africa.14 The unwillingness of 
some rice exporting members to accept “automatic trigger” modalities might be assuaged 
more easily with a WTO decision clarifying the green box compatibility of such schemes 
based on “regional solidarity mainly at market rates”. 
2. The second “low hanging fruit” is the G-20 proposal on TRQ fills. Here again, the pro-
posal probably aims too high in requiring steps leading to higher fill rates, something dan-
gerously close to an import obligation which is completely alien to the very concept of 
TRQs. Instead, a process of mandatory enquiries into low fill rate situations, based on the 
WTO-scheduled commitments to open import markets without any reserves for all TRQ 
quantities would appear to be acceptable to all if it was focused only on the principle of 
“automatic licensing” as described in the Import Licensing Agreement. 
3. Mysteriously, the decisions made on food export restrictions by the G20 Summit at 
Cannes in 201115 and reiterated at Los Cabos in 201216 to exempt WFP and other non-
commercial food purchases from export restrictions and prohibitions have never 
made it on to a WTO Ministerial agenda.17 So far, nobody seems to have re-tabled the 
proposal in the run-up to Bali. Here again, if the NFIDC get their act and courage together 
and unanimously call for a WTO endorsement of those decisions (adjusted as per the text 
negotiated in November 2005 at the Hong Kong Ministerial), I daresay no Minister in Bali 
will seriously oppose a proposal adopted at two G20 Summits, even though the last sum-
mit in St. Petersburg (5–6 September 2013) no longer insisted on this matter.18 
Christian Häberli 
13 Sally Trethewie, The ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserve (APTERR): Cooperation, commitment and 
contradictions (NTS Working Paper no. 8, Singapore: RSIS Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies, 
2013). 
14 Cf. UNCTAD, The Potential Establishment of Emergency Food Reserve Funds (Discussion paper 3 written by 
Thomas Lines, November 2011), and ICTSD, Face à la crise alimentaire, la CEDEAO opte pour un stock ré-
gional de sécurité alimentaire (12/4 Passerelles,  novembre 2011). 
15 “We agree to remove food export restrictions or extraordinary taxes for food purchased for non-commercial 
humanitarian purposes by the World Food Program and agree not to impose them in the future. In this regard, we 
encourage the adoption of a declaration by the WTO for the Ministerial Conference in December 2011.” 
16 “We reaffirm our commitment to remove export restrictions and extraordinary taxes on food purchased for 
non-commercial humanitarian purposes by the World Food Programme (WFP).” 
17 Egypt had actually tried to place this item on the MC7 Agenda, but in the overall Doha debacle this attempt 
failed. In the light of the NFIDC Marrakesh Declaration which proved its uselessness in the food crisis of 2008–
09, a more serious attempt next time seems necessary. 
18 G20 Leaders’ Declaration: “We support discussions in the WTO to respond to legitimate food security con-
cerns, without distorting trade, including those related to carefully targeted policies to protect vulnerable popula-
tions […] We reaffirm our determination to implement all previous G20 commitments and existing initiatives 
including that stated in the Action Plan on Food Price Volatility and Agriculture which the G20 endorsed in 
2011.” (para 82). 
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ANNEXES (4) 
1. The Food Security Tool Box 
 Hypothesis: food security is about production, processing and consumption but 
(also) a matter of trade and (international) technology and investment.  
 This list does not address WTO compatibility or relevance of any of these tools. 
 International trade: tariffs, quotas (tariff-rate quotas or quantitative restrictions), 
safeguards, trade remedies, balance of payments measures, health and environment 
protection measures, import standards, technical regulations, various export competi-
tion measures including export credits, export state trading and international food aid, 
export taxes and restrictions; multilateral and regional trade agreements 
 Commerce: commodity exchanges, futures and other risk hedging instruments, re-
gional and virtual food reserve schemes, trade promotion 
 Investment: impact assessment, international protection agreements, investment and 
production credits, FDI incentives and contracts 
 Production: various forms of stockpile policies, (staple) food production support, 
production risk insurance schemes (subsidised or not), access to credits, meteorologi-
cal forecasts, biofuels, biotech regulations, organic production standards and subsidies, 
input subsidies (infrastructure and/or operating costs) 
 Science and education: research, policy advice, training and extension services 
 Legal issues: land tenure, women’s rights, ancestral and communal rights protection, 
cooperatives rules, access to courts 
 Social policies: support schemes for (small) farmers, gender measures, domestic food 
aid, emergency measures, resource retirement, migration policies, legal assistance 
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2. The problem with Agricultural FDI 
This short note does not purport to discuss the merits or non-merits of foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) in agriculture. Its purpose is to highlight the relation with food security at the local 
level and, in particular, with policies regarding small farmers and social issues. 
Despite a universal chorus of support for small farmers, the choices available to them and to 
countries with a poor resource endowment and investment climate remain largely untested. 
My research question here is whether large acquisitions of agricultural land are in reality 
made possible by long-standing neglect and farm, investment and trade policy biases, with the 
connivance of both donor and investor home countries. In a recent article for IISD we wrote 
that “Inadequate control of agro-FDI can actually result in the host state violating its interna-
tional legal obligations to its citizens in relation to the right to food.”19 What is also clear to 
me is that aid agencies and NGOs have their own agendas. 
One case in point is Madagascar (where I worked from 1978–80). This country had the first 
widely publicised “land grab” case – which apparently even toppled its government – in 2008, 
when the Korean Company Daewoo wanted to produce feed maize for Korean cattle. My 
point here is not whether that project was good or bad for food security – it probably was not 
– but that Madagascar and its unique nature and biodiversity were destroyed not by cash crop 
projects or by tropical timber exports. The main cause was widespread slash-and-burn by poor 
farmers who had no alternative means to survive other than by destroying their own liveli-
hood. And I feel sad to recall that Madagascar is a country which has had heavy Swiss in-
volvement for decades, through governmental and NGO and church development projects. 
The experience today seems to show this picture: 
1. Home countries still lack a legal analysis of the international regulatory framework in 
which investment projects – whether legal or not – are taking place. The well-known 
fragmentation between human rights and trade policies prevents governments from seeing 
that both trade and investment laws, at the national and international levels, show lacunae 
which condone land grab and reduce national food security. The recent commodity report 
by the Swiss Government is sad evidence of this fragmentation.20 
2. In the absence of appropriate policy reforms, and where “small” means less efficient and 
productive farming than could be achieved through large-scale FDI, national food security 
might indeed be better off with well-managed foreign investment – even where the pro-
duction is exported as cash crops or processed into biofuels.21 
19 Häberli and Smith (2013). 
20 Background Report: Commodities. Report of the interdepartmental platform on commodities to the Federal 
Council (http://www.seco.admin.ch/aktuell/00277/01164/01980/index.html?lang=en&msg-id=48319 last visited 
15/05/13). 
21 “Agro-FDI is a two-edge sword therefore: only when managed properly will it bring food security benefits. 
However, the current global governance structure for agro-FDI unevenly distributes rights and obligations be-
tween the host state, the investor and the investor’s home state in such a way that there is very little legally en-
forceable obligation (at the regional and international level) on the investor to conduct its investment in ways 
that do not undermine the host state’s food security; and there are also limited legally enforceable, or ‘hard law’, 
obligations on the part of the investor’s home state to reinforce ‘ethical’ behaviour of investors abroad” (Häberli 
and Smith 2013). 
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3. Agrodumping Today – and Tomorrow 
Even though in times of high world market prices, export subsidies have largely disappeared, 
they can easily be reintroduced within the WTO limits agreed. The now failed Doha Round 
would have considerably tightened the purse strings of rich supporters of farmers. Besides, the 
now fashionable RTAs reduce applied agricultural tariffs among treaty members – while re-
moving permanent and temporary protection for farmers in poor countries, and increasing the 
“spaghetti bowl” syndrome at the expense of non-participants. But these preferential agree-
ments will never solve the “overhang” of trade-distorting domestic support (Bureau and Jean). 
Recent agricultural reform legislation, including in the EU, in the next US Farm Bill, and in 
Switzerland, accentuate this problem with their new trade-distorting support programmes, 
even in the name of food security and of climate change mitigation: 
1. The EU Commission pretends to “green” the CAP by a recoupling of the Single Farm 
Payment to crop diversification – which implies virtually no production change for EU 
farmers. It even hails this proposal as a contribution to climate change mitigation.22 In 
WTO terms, however, this just looks like yet another case of “box painting.” 
2. In the US, major aid NGOs have finally realised that tied food aid is inefficient and bad, 
but they forget that Congress will only approve food aid if it comes in-kind and from 
American farms.23 Additional WTO-related problems in the new Farm Bill are the fore-
seeable non-reform of the US cotton regime (despite Brazilian opposition), and the new 
scheme called “Cooperatives Working Together (CWT)” an apparently privately funded 
programme providing export assistance to US dairy producers.24 
3. Switzerland, of course, has the best food security. The Swiss Parliament has just intro-
duced the notion of food sovereignty into the Federal Farm Act, together with a new form 
of direct payment called “food security contribution”, and with an injunction to the Gov-
ernment to increase subsidies on feed production (i.e. the sector where Swiss Agriculture 
is least competitive and where even poor developing countries might have had a chance to 
increase revenues and finance their food import bills). Almost funny here is the Govern-
ment’s own definition of food sovereignty: “long-term satisfaction of consumer needs for 
high-quality and sustainably produced domestic food.” And politicians of all colours 
praise the sustainability of the Swiss agricultural policy, conveniently forgetting that this 
is only made possible by one of the world’s strongest border protection and taxpayer sup-
port systems – and an occasional breach of Switzerland’s WTO obligations by dumping 
subsidised butter exports in developing countries. The Swiss Farmer Association, like Via 
Campesina which first coined this unfortunate term, sees “food sovereignty” as a right to 
define agricultural policy autonomously, and implicitly as a way of reserving Swiss con-
sumers for Swiss producers. 
22 Crop Rotation: Benefiting farmers, the environment and the economy. Study co-financed by the European 
Community, Directorate-General for the Environment and the MAVA Foundation, published by APRODEV 
(Association of World Council of Churches related Development Organisations in Europe), Friends of the Earth 
Europe, IFOAM EU Group and Pesticide Action Network Europe (July 2012). 
23 Unfortunately, it appears that in their field operations, US NGOs like Oxfam America still practice food aid 
with a price-depressing effect on local farmers – even when they know about this and try to change it, for in-
stance with food vouchers. For Ethiopia, see my Working Paper at 
(http://www.wti.org/research/publication/?tx_nccr_pi1[show]=468&cHash=db90fb53ddf44e601001ee286ebb08
8e). 
24 Inside U.S. Trade – 26 April 2013, Vol. 31, No. 17. 
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